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The Early Years of the Iowa Democratic
Revival, 1950-1956
THOMAS G.RYAN
AMONG THE MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS in American politics during
the tbird quarter of the twentieth century was a decrease in tra-
ditional sectional voting behavior and an accompanying
increase in tbe number of competitive states. Although the
Soutb is tbe most obvious example of tbese developments, witb
a sbarply increased Republican vote since tbe early 1950s,
counter trends have emerged in tbe western Middle West and in
northern New England, two areas wbere the Democratic vote
has increased markedly in tbe last twenty-five years. ^
Since tbe first Eisenhower election in 1952, historians, politi-
cal scientists and journalists bave chronicled and analyzed tbe
An earlier version of this article was presented to the 1978 meeting of the Iowa
College Teachers of History. The author would like to thank Charles E. Quirk
and Robert L. Ross, both of Northern Iowa, for their comments and suggestions
on the earlier draft. He would also like to thank the University of Northern
Iowa for the financial support which facilitated the research and the writing,
and UNI's Academic Computing Center for its technical assistance in analyzing
quantitative data.
' An indication of the increased Republican vote in the South, and the reverse
phenomenon in a number of northern states, is readily avaffcble in Richard M.
Scammon, ed., America at the Polls: A Handbook of American Presidential
Election Statistics, 1920-1964 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,
1965), and Guide to U.S. Elections {Washington: Congressional Quarterly,
1976).
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changes in southern politics in a massive, body of literature.^
Marked Democratic gains in tbe western Middle West and in
nortbern New England during these same years, however, bave
attracted far less attention from botb journalistic and academic
observers of American politics. Iowa is one midwestern state
wbose Democratic party bas recorded some of tbe most striking
gains registered by a former minority party since 1950.
Analysis of aggregate voting and demograpbic data, as well
as of newspaper accounts of Iowa politics, indicates tbat Repub-
lican gubernatorial factionalism contributed more tban any
otber factor to the increased Democratic gubernatorial vote of
1952, 1954, and 1956, tbe first and most important development
in tbe early years of tbe Iowa Democratic revival. Republican
gubernatorial factionalism explains 1950s Democratic guberna-
torial gains better tban do eitber urbanization-industrialization
or Democratic party revitalization, tbe two factors most fre-
quently cited in earlier attempts to account for tbe increased
Democratic sbare of tbe Iowa vote. Altbough urbanization and
industrialization preceded and accompanied the increasing
Democratic vote for governor, analysis of demographic and of
voting data reveals tbat tbe party's sbare of tbe vote increased
no more rapidly in urban tban in rural areas. After 1952, the
Democratic percentage of the Iowa vote for both governor and
president increased most sharply in rural areas buffeted by the
falling farm prices which characterized the years of the first
Eisenhower administration. The role of Republican guber-
natorial factionalism in contributing to the increased Demo-
cratic vote of the early and mid-1950s is also apparent in the
much larger gains posted by Democratic candidates for gover-
nor than by the party's nominees for other offices. Republican
gubernatorial weakness, rather than across-the-board Demo-
cratic strength, explains the shift in the 1950 to 1956 guberna-
torial voting behavior of Iowans.
introduction to the burgeoning literature on political change in the
South see, among oftiers. Jack Bass and Walter DeVries, The Transformation
of Southern Politics: Social Change and Political Consequences Since 1945
(New York; Basic Books, 1976); Monroe Lee Billington, The Political South in
the Twentieth Century (New York: Scribners, 1975); and William C. Havard,
ed.. The Changing Politics of the South (Baton Kou^e: Louisiana State, 1972).
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In viewing the Iowa political landscape of the last forty years,
1956 stands out as the pivotal year. In 1956, Iowans elected a
Democratic governor for the first time in twenty years. They
also elected a Democrat to the United States House of Represen-
tatives for the first time since 1940. Unlike the Democratic gains
of 1932, which were massive, depression-based, and temporary,
the 1956 achievements were limited, do not appear to have been
related to such national phenomena as the business cycle, or to
international developments, and have continued to grow, albeit
irregularly, in the quarter century following that election.
As Table 1 indicates, the election of a Democratic governor in
1956 resulted neither from a sharp increase in the Democratic
percentage of the gubernatorial vote between 1954 and 1956,
nor from a steady increase in the Democratic share of the vote
over a period of several elections. In electoral terms, two factors
produced a 1956 Democratic gubernatorial triumph. One was a
modest increase (2.9 percentage points) in the Democratic per-
centage of gubernatorial vote between 1954 and 1956; the other
was a sharp increase (7.3 percentage points) in the Democratic
gubernatorial vote four years earlier.^
Thus the origins of the state's Democratic revival are in the
1952 election, the first bid for the state's highest office by
Herschel Loveless, the successful Democratic gubernatorial
candidate in 1956. In the first Loveless election, despite the land-
slide victory registered by the remainder of the Republican ticket
in Iowa, the Republican gubernatorial candidate, William S.
Beardsley, won re-election with less than 52.0 percent of the
vote, the first Republican gubernatorial candidate in sixteen
years to fall below that figure. Beardsley not not only ran 7.2
percentage points behind his own 1950 share of the vote, but
' Unless indicated otherwise, changes in a candidate's (or a party's) vote from
election to election, or the variation between votes received by a party's candi-
dates for different offices in the same election, refer to increases or decreases in
the candidate's (party's) share of the vote, rather than to changes in the number
of votes received. The 2.9 percentage point increase in the Democratic guber-
natorial vote between 1954 and 1956 indicates that the party's share of the vote
for that office increased from 48.3 percent in 1954 to 51.2 percent in 1956.
Whenever the quantitative data cited in the text are taken from the tables
included in the paper, no further citations to the sources oí those data will be
given. 1
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trailed the 1952 Republican presidential candidate, Dwight D.
Eisenhower, by 11.9 percentage points.
On the Republican side the 1952 election was notable on
several counts. One was the decrease of 7.2 percentage points in
the party's share of the gubernatorial vote between 1950 and
1952. This was the largest decline in the Republican share of the
vote for that office in consecutive elections since the Depression
losses of 1930 to 1932." The earlier decrease, however, was
part of an across-the-board decline in the party's vote, as large
numbers of voters vented their anger at the Great Depression on
Republican candidates at all levels. The 1950 to 1952 drecrease in
the Republican gubernatorial vote, unlike the decrease twenty
years earlier, came in an election when other Republican candi-
dates ran ahead of the vote in 1948 and in 1950.
A second noteworthy characteristic of the 1952 election in
Iowa was the sharp contrast between the Republican presiden-
tial and gubernatorial votes. While Beardsley won 7.2 percent-
age points less in the 1952 vote than he had in 1950, Eisen-
hower's percentage of the presidential vote was 16.2 percentage
points ahead of Thomas E. Dewey's in 1948. Eisenhower was
the first Republican presidential candidate since Herbert Hoover
in 1928 to capture more than 52.0 percent of the Iowa vote. His
63.8 percent exceeded the percentage of all other Republican
presidential candidates in Iowa since Warren G. Harding won
70.9 percent in 1920.^
The divergent paths of the Republican presidential and guber-
natorial votes in 1952 resulted from a third feature of the elec-
tion, a marked increase in split-ticket voting. The minimum
figure was 11.9 percent, the difference between the Eisenhower
and the Beardsley percentages of the vote. This was more than
double the average amount of ticket splitting in the six presi-
dential elections preceding 1952.*'
A substantial increase in the number of votes cast, and in the
percentage of eligible voters who went to the polls, also dis-
Uowa Official Register, 1931-1932. pp. 436-437; 1933-1934, pp. 248-249;
1935-1936, pp. 314-315.
'Official Register, 1921-1922, pp. 452-454; 2925-1926, pp. 536-537;
1929-1930. pp. 422-423; 1933-1934, pp. 248-249.
"Official Register, 1929-1930, pp. 422-423; 1933-1934, pp. 248-249.
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tinguished the 1952 presidential election. As Table 2 indicates,
the number of Iowans voting for president jumped more than
230,000 between 1948 and 1952, an increase of 22.2 percent.
The state's voter turnout rate increased from 62.4 percent in
1948 to 75.S percent in 1952.'
Because the increase in the total vote and the increase in the
Republican percentage of the presidential vote were both large
and pervasive in 1952, occurring throughout the nation,
previous accounts give these developments considerable atten-
tion. Less obvious, because most observers of American politics
focus on presidential contests, was a marked increase in the
total vote, and in voter turnout, in the off-year election immedi-
ately preceding the first Eisenhower-Stevenson contest. As
Table 2 suggests, between 1946 and 1950 the total gubernatorial
vote in Iowa increased 39.7 percent, well over half again as
much as the 22.2 percent increase in the presidential vote
between 1948 and 1952. This development was not unique to
Iowa. Between 1946 and 1950, the number of persons voting for
governor increased in thirty-three of the thirty-four states
holding gubernatorial elections both years, with a mean
increase of 28.0 percent in the thirty-four states. Thus the
increase in voter turnout associated with the Eisenhower years
began two years before the general's first bid for the presi-
dency.*
Although the party's percentage of the gubernatorial vote
decreased more than seven percentage points from 1950 to
1952, Iowa Republicans retained the governorship, as William
Beardsley won a third term. Two years later, when each party
nominated a new candidate for governor, the Republicans again
won a close election, as Table 1 indicates, with neither party's
share of the vote changing more than one-half of one percentage
point. Despite the 1954 Republican victory and the negligible
change in each party's share of the vote, the Democratic per-
centage increased slightly. Clyde E. Herring, the son of a former
Democratic governor and United States senator, won 48.3
'U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colo-
nial Times to 1970, Bicentennial Edition, Part 1 (Washington, 1975), p. 1071.
" Richard M. Scammon, ed., America Votes: A Handbook of Contemporary
American Election Statistics. 1 (New York; Macmillan, 1956), passim.
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percent of tbe vote, tbe largest percentage of any Democratic
gubernatorial candidate since 1936, tbe last year tbat party
captured tbe statebouse. Herring's total suggested tbat tbe 1952
Democratic gubernatorial vote was not fortuitous, and tbat a
bigb degree of competition bad returned to Iowa politics, at
least in contests for tbe governorship.
Tbe narrow Republican gubernatorial victory in 1954, like
tbat in 1952, revealed widespread ticket splitting as tbe new
governor, Leo A. Hoegb, ran almost six percentage points
behind tbe Republican candidate for state auditor. Tbis was tbe
second largest differential between tbe Republican percentages
of tbe vote for tbese two offices since 1920, and was almost four
times tbe mean differential in tbe fifteen elections from 1922
tbrougb 1950.' Considerable ticket splitting also characterized
tbe 1954 contest for tbe United States Senate, witb tbe Republi-
can cballenger. Congressman Tbomas E. Martin, running well
behind tbe normal Republican vote, i.e., the vote for state audi-
tor. Altbougb Martin defeated the incumbent. Democratic
Senator Guy M. Gillette, bis sbare of tbe vote was five percent-
age points less tban tbat of the Republican candidate for state
auditor. ^ °
In addition to tbe small Republican margin in tbe governor's
race and tbe large differential between tbe Republican vote for
governor and that for auditor, a third feature of recent elections
also cbaracterized tbe 1954 contest. As Table 2 indicates, voter
turnout continued at about tbe same relatively bigb level
recorded in 1950, and well above tbe 1942 and 1946 turnout
figures.
If any doubts existed regarding tbe reliability of tbe 1952 and
1954 gubernatorial election results as indicators of on-going
political developments in Iowa, the 1956 contest erased them.
"Official Register. 1921-1922, pp. 461-462; 1923-1924. pp. 497-498; 1925-
1926, pp. 542-543; 1927-1928. pp. 460-461; I929-I930, pp. 426-427; 1931-
1932, pp. 440-441; 1933-1934, pp. 250-251; 1935-1936, pp. 316-317.
^"Official Register, 1955-1956. pp. 334-336. Martin's relatively poor
showing, like Hoegh's, resulted from a factor other than a basic realignment
of the Iowa electorate. His opponent was a popular incumbent who had run
far ahead of the rest of the ticket in 1948, when he and President Harry S.
Truman were the only Democrats to win statewide contests in Iowa.
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Altbougb Eisenhower and most otber Republican candidates
carried tbe state bandily, Iowa Democrats won tbe governor-
sbip for tbe first time in twenty years. Herschel Loveless, who
bad run well in his first bid in 1952, not only won election, but
also captured a larger percentage of tbe vote than all but two
previous Democratic gubernatorial candidates since 1885."
Only in the landslide Depression years of 1932 and 1934 did
Iowa Democrats win tbe governorship with a larger percentage
of the vote than Loveless captured in 1956.
Iowa election results since 1956 attest to the importance of the
Loveless-Hoegh contest as the beginning of a new era in Iowa
political life. Since 1956, the former minority party has attained
a status of rough equality with the Iowa Republican party in
such areas as electoral success in both statewide and local con-
tests, and in the number of registered voters who identify witb
each of the two major parties. Unlike earlier Democratic guber-
natorial victories such as those of Horace Boies in 1889 and
1891, Herschel Loveless' triumphs in 1956 and 1958 contributed
significantly to a subsequent realignment of the Iowa elector-
ate.'^
.ALTHOUGH most journalists and academicians have largely
ignored recent Democratic gains in the western Middle West
and northern New England, a few observers have described and
attempted to explain these developments. An Iowa City native
described and analyzed the state's Democratic revival in his
1977 Harvard senior honors thesis, a journal article, and a
book.'^ Iowa journalists also usually attempt to explain the
election results they describe.
''OfficialRegister. 1886. pp. 90-91; 1888, p. 139; 1890, p. 190; 1892, p. 233;
1894, p. 186; 1896, p. 222; 1898, p. 227; 1900. p. 314; 1902. p. 368; 1904,
p. 347; 1907-1908. p. 490; 1909-1910, p. 485; 1911-1912, p. 448; 1913-1914. p.
483; 1915-1916. p. 506; 1917-1918. p. 485; 1919-1920. p. 364.
"Chiefly because the Republican party was badly divided on the question
of temperance legislation, Boies, a former Republican, captured the governor-
ship in 1889 and again in 1891. These were the first Democratic gubernatorial
victories since Stephen Hempstead's in 1849 and 1851, and the last until Clyde
Herring's in 1932 and 1934. Official Register. 1977-1978. pp. 292-294.
"James C. Larew, "A Party Rebom: The Democrats in Iowa, 1950-1974",
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Previous interpretations of the early stages of the Iowa Demo-
cratic renaissance are chiefly of two types—those wbicb empha-
size long-term developments and those wbicb focus on more
immediate events. Among the long-term developments wbicb
are alleged to have contributed to tbe Democratic revival in
Iowa are the urbanization and the industrialization of tbe state.
According to this interpretation, as increasing proportions of
Iowans moved to urban areas and accepted non-agricultural
employment after World War II, substantial numbers of them
modified their political values and priorities regarding such
questions as labor unions, unemployment insurance, taxation,
legislative apportionment, social services, and such aspects of
personal conduct as the use of alcoholic beverages. According to
those who emphasize these basic changes in tbe structure of
society and in Iowans' perceptions of a desirable social and
political order, the Democratic party responded to changing
conditions and to new demands by the voters more readily than
the Republican party; thereby it gained the support of increas-
ing numbers of Iowa voters, particularly those in urban areas.
Although many of tbese developments culminated during the
governorship of Harold Hughes, in tbe 1960s, writers who
emphasize changes in the state's economy and demography
locate many of these developments in the seventeen years pre-
ceding Hughes's first election as governor. ^ ^
A second interpretation emphasizes the reorganization, the
revitalization and the modernization of the Democratic party in
Iowa. According to this view, the Democratic party would
achieve equality witb its chief rival only if it shed its traditional
image, both as a loser and as a dispenser of patronage, and
become a highly organized, issue-oriented, and urban-based
political mechanism. Proponents of this view regard the dis-
(senior honors thesis. Harvard University, 1977); "A Party Reborn: Harold
Hughes and the Iowa Democrats," Palimpsest 59 (October 1978): 148-161; A
Party Reborn: The Democrats of Iowa, Î950-I974 (Iowa City: Iowa State His-
torical Department, 1980). All subsequent citations to Larew's work will be to
the 1980 volume.
^*Larew, A Party Reborn, pp. 8-9, 21-34, 46-57, 63-68, 75, 85-87, 136; Eliza-
beth Drew, "A Reporter at Large: John C. Culver - II," New Yorker, 54
118 September 1978): 46.
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missal of Jake More as state party chairman, and the rise to
prominence of such men as Wade Clarke, Neal Smith, Lex
Hawkins, and Robert L. Johnston as critical to the transforma-
tion of Iowa politics from Republican dominance to two-party
balance and competition. Those who emphasize the role of
organization in party affairs also note the later efforts of such
men as Dick Clark and John Culver in organizing tbe Second
Congressional District, and later the entire state, in Culver's
and Clark's successful congressional and senatorial races of
1964 through 1974.•'
The urbanization-industrialization interpretation of Demo-
cratic gains in Iowa explains little, if any, of the early advances
in the state's Democratic revival. Although the increase in the
party's percentage of tbe gubernatorial vote between 1950 and
1952 correlated positively with the percentage of the male labor
force in manufacturing, as indicated in Table 3, the 1954 to 1956
Democratic increase correlated negatively with manufacturing
employment. For the entire period, 1950 to 1956, there was
virtually no relationship between the Democratic increase and
the proportion of males employed in manufacturing.
When 1950 to 1956 Iowa voting behavior is compared with the
degree of urbanization, rather than with the relative size of the
manufacturing labor force, the results are similar. Although the
most urban Iowa counties recorded above-average increases in
their Democratic percentage of the gubernatorial vote between
1950 and 1952, they registered small Democratic gubernatorial
increases than less urban counties between 1954 and 1956, and
between 1950 and 1956.^ "
Similar conclusions follow from a comparison of the Demo-
cratic gubernatorial gains with the relative size of the agricul-
tural labor force. Between 1950 and 1952, the most agrarian
counties recorded smaller Democratic increases than other
counties. Four years later, however, the same counties registered
the largest Democratic increases. In the six-year period covered
by the four gubernatorial elections of 1950 through 1956, the
'^Larew, A Party Reborn; Drew, "Reporter, " p. 46.
"For an indication of the measurement of urbanism, see George B. Mather,
Effects of the Use of Voting Machines on Total Vote Cast: Iowa—1920-1960
(Iowa City; Institute of Public Affairs, 1964), pp. 12-13.
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size of the Democratic increase correlated slightly with the size
of the agricultural labor force.
In the early years of the Iowa Democratic revival, urban-
industrial counties recorded slightly smaller, not larger. Demo-
cratic percentage gains than more rural counties. Because of
their larger populations, urban counties may have contributed
more votes to the increased Democratic tally than rural coun-
ties, but there is no evidence that the Democratic percentage of
the vote increased more rapidly in urban counties in the first
seven years of the 1950s.
Interpretations of recent Iowa Democratic gains which
emphasize the role of a reorganized and revitalized Democratic
party organization concentrate on the period after 1958, the
year in which Jake More's critics succeeded in ousting him from
the chairmanship, with particular emphasis on the six years fol-
lowing the election of 1960, when Lex Hawkins headed the Iowa
Democratic party. Because of the time element, it is difficult to
assess the impact of party organization work on the Iowa
Democratic vote during the period covered by the present
study. Despite this difficulty, however, the prominent role of
men like Lex Hawkins, Wade Clarke, Neal Smith, and Robert
Johnston in the Polk County Democratic party, in the decade
before they captured control of the state organization, provides
an opportunity to assess the impact of their organizational
work on voting behavior during the early years of the Iowa
Democratic revival. This can be done by comparing Demo-
cratic achievements in Polk County with those in the rest of the
state during the years when Hawkins and others perfected their
methods in the state's largest county. If improved organiza-
tional techniques contributed as much to the Iowa Democratic
revival as the admirers of the new methods contend, the accom-
plishments of the Polk County Democratic organization should
have surpassed those of other county units during the decade
preceding More's defeat.
A comparison of developments in Polk County with those in
the rest of the state during these years offers little, if any, sup-
port for interpretations which attribute much of the Democratic
renaissance to a revitalized party organization. Between 1950
and 1956, the Democratic percentage of the gubernatorial vote
55
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in Polk County increased son:iewhat less than the statewide
figure, 9.3 percentage points compared with 10.7 percentage
points.
A comparison of the increase in voter turnout in Polk County
and the rest of the state, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, could
be interpreted as offering some support for those who empha-
size the voter-registration activities and the election-day efforts
to get out the vote of the Polk County Democratic organiza-
tion, as an important source of the increase in the Democratic
share of the vote. Voter turnout in Iowa's largest county
increased more than in the rest of the state. Between 1946 and
1950, the Polk County increase was 11.5 percentage points,
comfortably above the statewide increase of 8.2. Between 1948
and 1952, Polk County again recorded an increase in voter
turnout above the statewide figure, 18.2 compared with 13.4
percentage points. ^ ' The failure of Democrats in Polk County to
surpass those in other parts of the state in registering Demo-
cratic percentage-of-the-vote increases during the Beardsley-
Loveless years, however, suggests that not nearly all of the
above-average increase in the county's turnout rate can be
attributed to Democratic party organizational work.
Among the more transient factors cited as explanations of the
early years of the Iowa Democratic revival are specific political
issues and personalities. Interpretations of this type are most
commonly offered in explaining the results of particular elec-
tions, e.g., the narrow Republican gubernatorial victory in
1952, or the election of a Democratic governor four years later.
In the first six years of the 1950s, the substantive issues included
proposals to permit the union shop, others to reapportion the
legislature, and some to legalize the sale of liquor by the drink.
Thesales tax, particularly after the legislature increased it from
2 to 2V2 percent in 1955, also attracted much attention.'"
^'U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Sixteenth Census of
the United States: 1940, Population, Volume 2, Characteristics of the Popu-
lation, Part 2, Florida-Iowa, pp. 872-877; U.S. Census of Population: 1950,
Volume 2, Characteristics of the Population, Part 15, Iowa, pp. 83-99; U.S.
Census of Population: 1960. Volume 1, Characteristics of the Population,
Part 17, Iowa, pp. 110-134.
"Numerous issues of the Des Moines Register, and of the Sunday Register,
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Republican Leo A. Hoegh {left) and
Democrat Herschel Loveless (right),
opponents in Iowa's 1956 guberna-
torial contest.
Although neither party in the 1950s produced so dominant a
political personality as Harold Hughes or Robert Ray, earlier
writers emphasize personal as well as substantive factors in
attempting to explain political developments during the
Beardsley-Loveless years, with the personal and the substantive
often combining to shape public perceptions of political figures.
Among the factors cited were Governor Beardsley's decision to
seek a third term in 1952, thereby creating tensions within the
Republican party. The third-term decision was especially inter-
esting in view of Beardsley's successful challenge to an earlier
Republican governor, Robert D. Blue in 1948, when that official
sought the party's nomination for a third term. In addition to
indicate the more salient political questions of 1950-1956. Among others see:
10 October 1950, p. 7; 19 October 1950, p. 25; 2 November 1950, p. 18;
4 November 1950, p. 3; 17 May 1954, p. 1-L; 24 May 1954, p. 3; 26 May 1954,
p. 1; 29 May 1954, p. 1; 1 June 1954, p. 10; 3 June 1954, p. 1; 17 October 1954,
p. 7-L; 20 May 1956, pp. 5-L, 6-L; 27 May 1954, p. 6-L; 8 November 1956,
p . l .
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those Republicans who criticized Beardsley when he announced
for a tbird term, others, including his opponents in the 1952
Republican primary, faulted him for his well publicized per-
sonal income-tax problems, and for allegedly attempting to sell
diseased livestock."
Considerable numbers of Republicans also attacked Beards-
ley's successor, Leo A. Hoegh, whom Beardsley bad appointed
as attorney general, and who was widely regarded as Beardsley's
choice in tbe six-candidate contest for the 1954 Republican
gubernatorial nomination. Hoegh's convictions and actions
combined to irritate many Republicans. These included con-
servative Republicans in general, and the members of tbe Iowa
Manufacturers' Association in particular, both of whom
resented Hoegh's support for legislation wbicb would permit tbe
union shop in Iowa, and his efforts to establish closer contacts
between tbe Republican party and organized labor. ^ ° Some
criticized Hoegh for using the attorney general's office to curb
tbe sale of liquor by the drink, wbich was then illegal, while
others resented his announced opposition to proposals for tbe
legalization of liquor by tbe drink, and for bis definition of this
as a moral issue. Hoegb's aggressive governorship, in which he
resorted to publicizing tbe voting records of Republican legisla-
tors whom he accused of failing to support tbe party platform,
is also alleged to bave alienated many Republicans.^^
His record regarding taxation is widely believed to have con-
tributed to Hoegh's defeat in his 1956 bid for re-election. Per-
haps tbe most publicized action was the governor's acceptance
of a 1955 bill increasing the sales tax from 2 percent to IVz per-
cent, even though be opposed the measure, and in 1956 cam-
paigned for a return to the lower rate. According to Hoegb's
supporters, bis creation of an Iowa Tax Study Commission,
which he hoped would contribute to efforts to make the state's
tax system more fair, instead persuaded many that be sought to
^'Register: 22 May 1952. p. 1; 25 May 1952, p. 2-L; 28 May 1952, p. 1;
29 May 1952, p. 1; 1 June 1952, p. 2-L; 2 November 1952, p. 3-L; 5 November
1952, p. 11.
^"Regisfer: 1 October 1954, p. 1; 14 October 1954, p. 1;18 October 1954, p. 1;
1 November 1956, p. 9.
Register, 21 October 1956, p. 20-G.
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increase taxes. By 1956, Herschel Loveless and the Democratic
party fastened on Hoegh's record in the field of taxation, as they
campaigned against "High Tax Hoegh." Also alleged to have
weakened tbe governor for his bid for re-election were his many
travels, in Iowa and outside the state, as well as his butch baircut
and bis small mustacbe." By their very nature it is difficult, if not
impossible, to evaluate many of these explanations of Demo-
cratic gains and Republican losses in contests for the governor-
ship in the elections of 1952, 1954, and 1956. At least one of the
explanations, however, can be tested by the use of aggregate
voting data.
Although Republican and Democratic candidates for
governor during these years differed consistently and clearly in
tbeir announced positions on the question of the legalization of
tbe sale of liquor by the drink, and large numbers of Iowans on
eacb side of the issue appeared to regard it as a matter of consid-
erable importance, its impact upon voting behavior appears to
bave been negligible, as Table 3 indicates. Altbough counties
where dry sentiments were strongest increased tbeir Democratic
gubernatorial vote slightly less than other counties between
1950 and 1952, they recorded slightly larger Democratic
increases tban otber counties four years later, as well as for the
entire six-year period beginning with tbe election of 1950. Tbe
size of all of tbe correlations suggests that, despite the consid-
erable amount of interest in the issue, it was not sufficient to
modify traditional voting babits. Tbere is no evidence tbat the
increased support among Iowans for tbe legalization of liquor
by tbe drink, as reported by the Des Moines Register's Iowa
Poll, explains their increased approval of Democratic guberna-
torial candidates during these years."
Altbough urban counties registered larger Democratic guber-
natorial percentage increases than rural counties from 1950 to
1952, the latter posted the largest Democratic gains between
1954 and 1956, thereby enabling the traditional minority party
to capture tbe governorship for the first time in twenty years.
"Register: 18 October 1956, p. 3; 23 October 1956, p. 4; 1 November 1956,
p. 9; 8 November 1956, pp. 9, 10.
"Sunday Register: 15 June 1952, p. 4-A; 28 March 1954, p. 7-L; 24 February
1957, p. 12-G.
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Discontent with Hoegb contributed significantly to the voting
behavior of Iowa Republicans wbo abandoned tbe incunnbent
in his bid for a second term. Another factor, bowever, was
crucial in the creation of a Democratic gubernatorial majority
in 1956. This was tbe growing discontent of Iowa farmers witb
tbe level of farm prices and witb the agricultural policies of tbe
Eisenbower administration. Altbougb all but two Iowa counties
gave Adlai Stevenson a larger percentage of their vote in 1956
tban in 1952, rural counties posted tbe largest Democratic per-
centage increases, as Table 3 indicates. Two of the most urban
counties in tbe state, Dubuque and Linn, recorded the only
decreases in the Democratic percentage of tbe presidential vote
between 1952 and 1956. Tbis statewide reduction in tbe Repub-
lican vote at tbe head of tbe ticket, combined witb the high rate
of ticket splitting, enabled Iowa Democrats to capture the
governorsbip which had eluded tbem during most of the state's
history.
Most observers contend that a large turnout benefits Demo-
cratic candidates; however the record of the Beardsley-Loveless
years offers little support for that conclusion. Despite the co-
incidence of the increase in the Democratic gubernatorial vote
with the increase in the total vote in 1952, analysis of the two
developments indicates that, at least in Iowa, Eisenhower was
the chief beneficiary of the large increase in turnout.^* While it
is difficult to estimate the proportion of new voters who cast
ballots for Loveless, it appears clear that the largest contribu-
tions to his close race in 1952, as well as to his election four
years later, were the continued high level of support by Demo-
crats and a substantial increase in the Democratic gubernatorial
vote among Republicans.
Although the relatively larger voter turnout of the last thirty
years may have contributed to some of the Democratic gains of
this period, its impact on the Democratic gubernatorial
•^A further indication that a large vote did not necessarily benefit Demo-
cratic candidates is available in the 1950 gubernatorial election. In that
contest, 39.7 percent more Iowans voted for governor than in the preceding
off-year election. Despite the sharp increase in voter turnout, the Democratic
share of the vote for govemor decreased from 42.1 percent in 1946 to only
40.5 percent in 1950.
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advances of 1950 tbrougb 1956 was sligbt. Tbe most important
new ingredient in tbe elections of 1952, 1954, and 1956 was tbe
troubles of tbe Beardsley and Hoegh administrations. In the
election of 1956, agrarian discontent with the farm policies of
tbe Eisenhower administration weakened tbe Iowa Republican
party furtber, enabling Loveless to capture tbe governorship tbe
Democrats bad missed so narrowly in tbe two preceding
elections. Somewbat like Franklin D. Roosevelt's presidential
victory in 1932, Herscbel Loveless won tbe Iowa governorship
in 1956 primarily because be was tbe Democratic candidate at a
time wben tbe Republican incumbent no longer received tbe
support of all persons wbo bad voted Republican regularly in
the past.
IHE IOWA DEMOCRATIC REVIVAL of the third quarter of tbe
twentieth century started on a small scale in the early 1950s,
witb narrow Democratic defeats in the 1952 and 1954 guber-
natorial contests, followed by an equally-slim Democratic vic-
tory in tbe 1956 gubernatorial election. As subsequent events
would demonstrate, these were tbe early developments in a
statewide political upheaval which continued to unfold in tbe
1960s and 1970s, first in gubernatorial, later in congressional
and otber elections.
Altbougb increases in tbe Democratic share of the vote for
other offices soon followed the party's gubernatorial gains, the
earlier advances occurred independently of any general move
toward the Democratic party by Iowa voters in the early 1950s.
Indeed, the 7.3 percentage point increase in the Democratic
share of the gubernatorial vote between 1950 and 1952 occurred
despite a sharp increase (16.2 percentage points) registered in
the Republican presidential vote between 1948 and 1952, and
the impressive Republican gains in contests for other state
offices from 1950 to 1952. Although widespread decreases in the
Republican share of the presidential vote between the first and
the second Eisenhower elections, and the 1952 to 1954 and 1954
to 1956 Republican decreases in other statewide contests, can be
interpreted as evidence of a Democratic realignment, the de-
creases of 1952 to 1954 and of 1952 to 1956 were from the un-
usually high Republican percentages of 1952. Despite these de-
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creases, the 1956 Republican percentages for president and for
sucb state offices as auditor were equal to, or above, the compa-
rable vote in recent presidential years before 1952. As the data in
Table 1 indicate, Democratic gubernatorial gains in the early
1950s occurred without parallel changes in tbe distribution of
the vote for other statewide offices. The failure of other Demo-
cratic candidates to approximate the 1952 to 1956 achievements
of tbe party's gubernatorial nominees suggests tbat neither
urbanization-industrialization nor Democratic party revitaiiza-
tion contributed significantly to the party's increasing share of
the vote for governor. Had either of these other factors been pri-
mary elements in tbe increased Democratic gubernatorial vote
of 1950 to 1956, their role should bave been evident in an
across-the-ticket increase in the party's share of tbe Iowa vote.
It was divisions within tbe Iowa Republican party, rather
than urbanization-industrialization or Democratic party revi-
talization, which permitted Herschel Loveless and Clyde Her-
ring, in 1952 and 1954, to run mucb closer to their Republican
opponents than previous Democratic gubernatorial candidates
since 1938 bad done. With tbe aid of lower farm prices and of a
smaller voter turnout, both of which contributed to a decreased
Republican share of tbe vote at all levels. Loveless then defeated
Leo Hoegh in 1956, as each made a second bid for the state's
highest office. Tbe continuing gap between the Democratic
gubernatorial vote and the party's vote for other state offices,
e.g., auditor, treasurer, secretary of agriculture, and attorney
general, suggests strongly tbat Democratic gubernatorial gains
were well above any more general Democratic increase in the
1950s.
Democratic gubernatorial advances of tbe 1950s could bave
resulted from either, or botb, of two sources. One was Demo-
cratic strength; the otber was Republican weakness. Although
both Loveless and Herring ran far ahead of otber Democratic
gubernatorial candidates of the 1940s and 1950s, neither
appears to bave been a strong or popular candidate of the
Dwight Eisenhower, the Harold Hughes, or the Robert Ray
variety. After winning re-election in 1958, Loveless lost a 1960
bid for the United States Senate to Republican Jack Miller, who
had earlier won only 30.8 percent in the six-candidate Republi-
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can primary. Herring's moment of glory was even briefer, as his
1954 gubernatorial near-miss was his only statewide candidacy.
Republican weakness is the best explanation of Democratic
gubernatorial gains in the 1950s. Beardsley's income tax and
other troubles created serious divisions within the Republican
party in 1952, resulting in a bitter primary battle and in wide-
spread Republican defection in the general election. As Beards-
ley's chosen successor, Hoegh inherited his predecessor's prob-
lems, and added to them with his liberal views and his style of
political operation. Had Beardsley retired voluntarily after two
terms, or bad he lost his 1952 primary bid, it is probable that
the party's gubernatorial nominee would have ridden the Eisen-
hower coattails, as well as the sizeable Republican majority
among Iowa voters, to an easy victory in 1952. Without the
Republican near-defeat that year, and the divisiveness resulting
from it, it is highly unlikely that Iowa Democrats would have
posed much of a threat to continued Republican domination of
the governor's office in subsequent 1950s or early 1960s elec-
tions. Eisenhower's continued popularity in the state in 1956, as
well as Nixon's in 1960, suggests that Iowa Democrats would
not have captured the governorship any earlier than the 1964
Barry Goldwater debacle. Had Iowa entered that election witb a
Republican governor, it is highly improbable that the party's
problems at the presidential level would have produced Demo-
cratic gains of the magnitude recorded in 1964. Without Harold
Hughes as a popular incumbent in 1964, it is inconceivable that
Iowa Democrats could have recorded the sweeping victories
they achieved when they had both Hughes and Goldwater to
aid them in registering a Democratic landslide that year.
Gubernatorial factionalism within the state's Republican
party contributed more than any other factor to the electoral
accomplishments—both victories and near-victories—of the
gubernatorial wing of the Iowa Democratic party, 1952 to 1966.
The election and the subsequent administrations of Democratic
governors Loveless and Hughes then persuaded significant
numbers of Iowa voters to cast their ballots for Democratic
candidates for other offices, thereby contributing to an
increased Democratic vote at all levels in the longtime Republi-
can stronghold.
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